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Abstract
One cannot understand either culture or mind without taking account of themanner in which they interact in situ. The student of mind who ignores thecultural setting that mind requires in order to operate effectively fails to dojustice to the contextualized nature of mental activity. And to describe culturewithout regard to the limits imposed by our mental capacities is equallydisabling. This brief paper seeks to bring mind and culture into a workablerelation with each other.
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perhaps it would be better to say that it can be understood in manyways, ways that may often seem incompatible with each other. For insome deep sense, the human condition is shaped both by the biologicalconstraints inherent in our nature as a species living in a particularphysical environment, but at the same time it is also shaped by thesymbolically rich cultures that we humans construct and in terms ofwhich we live our lives communally.Indeed, uniquely as a species, we are both limited biologically, whileat the same time liberated from those limitations by our amazingcapacity to go beyond them, thanks to our capacity to construct“possible worlds” that transcend those limitations –or, in any case, thatgo beyond what seemed like limitations. We transcend the seeminglyirreversible laws of gravity by inventing flying machines, go beyond theconstraints of interpersonal communication by creating the Internet. In aword, then, we are constrained by our seeming biology, but liberatedfrom it by our capacity to create cultures that actualize the possibleworlds that we can imagine. There is no other species on the face of theearth that lives such a duality. Our human lives are a never endingdialectic between seeming constraints and imaginable possibilities.Our course, our capacity to recognize and to realize the possible, far­reaching though it may be, is also limited by what we might call theintrinsic constraints of culture. For in their very nature, the cultures wecreate are also constraining on those who live within their bounds. Forcultures in their own unique ways also limit the sense of the possibleamong those who live under their sway. For cultures too, if they are tobe viable, need to institute and to maintain a requisite stability andorder, whether by custom or by law, both which specify what ispermitted and what forbidden. In a word, cultures, while freeing us toexplore. Possibility also bind us to what is established.Our human lives, then, are an endless dialectic between establishedconvention and the temptation of the possible. And yet, for all that, it isa livable, feasible dialectic –though, alas, we must also pay a price inconflict and anxiety for living such dialectical lives.
n the deepest sense, psychology seeks to research and tounderstand the human condition. But the human condition,given its multifaceted nature, is not easily understood. OrI
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But it is this perpetual compromise between the already Establishedand the imaginably Possible, however much it may generate conflict andanxiety, that also generates our remarkable human creativity. For livinglife in full conformity to the Established soon creates boredom and adesire to escape. Yet, living with a desire only for what is Possible easilybecomes the road to crime and unacceptable non­conformity. So thechallenge of human life is to find a viable compromise between theEstablished and the Possible.And it is this challenge that I want to address now, for in my view, itis this very challenge that shapes how psychology should go about itsbusiness in researching the human condition. And let me confess that Idid not reach this conclusion only through general speculation. Indeed, Iwas forced into it by my own earliest research. Let me begin, then, bytelling you briefly how this came about.It began with my earliest efforts to clarify what constitutes per­ception, how we go about recognizing what it is that is impinging on oursenses. How lengthy a sensory input is needed for “the word out there”to be correctly recognized? My research instrument was a tachistoscope,a gadget that varies the length of exposure of a display. I’d begin byshowing each of my experimental subject a display (in someexperiments a picture, in others a word or pseudo­word) show it tothem, say, for a thousandth of a second. Having got their report on whatthey’d seen, I’d then increase the exposure time. How lengthy anexposure would it take for them to correctly recognize the display?I very soon discovered that my subjects, no matter how brief theexposure, almost always reported seeing something, though they’d oftenconfess that they were only “guessing”. But their guesses were by nomeans wild. First of all, their so­called guesses were highlyconventional, even banal, no matter how brief the input exposure mighthave been. Typically, for example, pseudo­words (like VERNALIT)were conventionalized into real words that conformed to Englishorthography (like VERBATIM).
And subjects often got trapped in their stereotypes. For, as exposuretime increased, they would often stick to the “guesses” they’d made tothe previous, briefer exposure.
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Eventually, of course, given a long enough time exposure, they’drecognize the exposed picture, word, or pseudo­word correctly. But itwould take longer for them to recognize the display correctly than itwould if they’d not first been exposed to those prior fast exposures.They seemed to be, as it were, victims of their earlier wrong guesses.And note two other things about their finally correct recognitionsunder these circumstances. First, they were often accompanied by agasp of surprise, so convinced were our subjects they that they’d alreadyrecognized it correctly on a briefer exposure. Plainly, they were victimsof their own previous conventionalizing efforts.All of which led me to propose what I called a hypothesis theory ofperception: that perceiving was guided by, steered by hypotheses aboutthe conventionally expected. So, for example, eight­letter pseudo­wordsthat were distant approximations to English took a much longerexposure time to be recognized than ones that more closelyapproximated conventional English letter sequences. Words (andpseudo­words) are processed with the expectation that they conform tospelling conventions or to social convention generally. With respect tothe latter, for example, dirty words (and lewd pictures) take much longerto recognize than conventionally “proper” ones if you start the sequenceof exposures way down below threshold level. Subjects get stuck withtheir wrong, early conventionalizing hypotheses.But note one other characteristic thing. Once a subject has beentachistiscopically exposed to a lewd picture or dirty word, he’ll moreeasily recognize such pictures or words when they’re subsequentlypresented to him. I asked one of our undergraduate subjects why thoughtthis was so. “Good Lord”, he said, “you don’t expect to be shown dirtypictures in a Harvard lab, do you? But then things change”. And thatremark from that seventeen­year­old freshman led me to another line ofwork –and to a refinement of the hypothesis theory.It had to do with the nature of expectancy. Let me put it this way. Yourexpectations are situationally determined, to be sure (you don’t expectto be exposed to dirty pictures in a respectable Harvard laboratory), butthose situational determinants also reflect broader features of your ownculture and of your orientation toward that culture, what the French liketo call your deformation professionelle. So, for example, I sometimeslook at the world passing by as a seasoned old New Yorker, sometimes
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as a psychologist law professor, sometimes as an adventurer out forsome fun. All of which will depend on whom I’m with, on what I’mdoing, and other circumstantial matters.Can a psychologist ignore such obvious matters in studying humanbehavior? And do our conventional psychological methods of research –the laboratory, the conventional interview, standardized tests, and therest – do these take such considerations into account? A psychologistcan learn a lesson or two from the anthropologist, the sociologist, eventhe historian. We will never understand human behavior simply bystudying it in vitro or out of context, without taking account of theuneasy historical compromise that exists between the Established andthe Possible, to revert to a distinction I made earlier.I began by exploring so intimately personal a matter as visualperception. And I want now to go to the opposite extreme, to illustratehow these matters also affect the seemingly impersonal domain of lawand jurisprudence.Let me begin by asking why, for example, the United States is theonly country left in the Western World that still punishes capital crimeswith de death penalty? Public opinion polls indicate that Americans areno more in favor of such a practice than any other country. How come,then, that we go on using this barbaric and demonstrably ineffectivepractice – ineffective, for it is well known than American states that stilluse the death penalty do not thereby reduce their capital crime rate. Mycolleague David Garland (2010) has just published a stunning book onthis baleful topic and it it is inrsistence of this barbaric practice dependsupon a massive distortion of the concept of punishment as retributionand an aspect of assuring public welfare. Capital punishment ispresented, instead, as part of a war against crime. We kill people inwars, don’t we? Consider this typical verbatim transcript of aprosecutor’s closing argument to the jury in a recent murder trial: “I sayto you we’re in a war again in this country, except it’s not a foreignnation, it’s against the criminal element in this country. The defendant,William Brooks, is a member of the criminal element, and he’s ourenemy” (Garland, 2010, p. 63). So, the administration of justice isconverted into a “war on crime,” and, as in war, your duty is to destroythe enemy. Not to do so is unpatriotic.
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To do it right, as I’ve already hinted, requires that we appreciate the“rules” of conventional narrative genres – as with the prosecutingattorney’s plea to the jury in the case just cited. A murderer in that genredeserves nothing better than death, eye­for­an­eye retribution in a “waron evil.”To grasp this more fully, we psychologists must return to the originsof this genres in our canonical bank of story forms. And that bank, wemust never forget, is in origin and in form a bank of conventionalnarrative genres. And we as psychologist must come to understandbetter the nature and origins of these genres. For these deeply affect theshape and course of human thought. Which brings us back to whatpsychology should be concerned with. How can we ever understand thecourse of thought without taking this deep­lying human tendency intoaccount?And so we must go beyond our conventional studies of logical andassociative thinking and into the realm of narrative thinking. And thatinevitably leads into partnership with those engaged in narrativeanalysis elsewhere, whether in literary studies, cultural andanthropology, or even in historiography. Indeed, it even partners us withthat rigid and hidebound discipline of law and jurisprudence wherejudicial decisions are so often influenced by narrative verisimilitude.We must come to understand better how a culture’s narrative formsbecome incorporated into our individual ways of conceiving of theworld, how a culture maintains itself by shaping and governing theminds of those who live under its sway. This is a question that haspuzzled mankind for a very long time, often quite productively. Indeed,it might be worthwhile to have a brief look at the past to see what wecan learn.Let’s begin with Jean­Jacques Rousseau and Baruch Spinoza. Spinozadrew a crucial distinction between what he called the “rightful power ofrule” (potestas) and the “actual power of government” (potential). Let’stranslate these as, roughly, “political rights” and “government rights.”Political rights are well defined in Rousseau’s famed Le Contrat Socialand are characterized as the customs, beliefs, and opinions of a people.He refers to these as “the State’s genuine constitution.” These rights, toquote the Oxford legal scholar, Martin Loughlin (2009), “imperceptibly
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could not exist without them.Let’s begin with Jean­Jacques Rousseau and Baruch Spinoza. Spinozadrew a crucial distinction between what he called the “rightful power ofrule” (potestas) and the “actual power of government” (potential). Let’stranslate these as, roughly, “political rights” and “government rights.”Political rights are well defined in Rousseau’s famed Le Contrat Socialand are characterized as the customs, beliefs, and opinions of a people.He refers to these as “the State’s genuine constitution.” These rights, toquote the Oxford legal scholar, Martin Loughlin (2009), “imperceptiblysubstitute the force of habit for that of authority.” Government rightscould not exist without them.Psychology, then, must concern itself with how the communal “forceof habit” shapes a fitting “force of government” and how, in the longrun, the latter manages to support and shape the former. Putpsychologically, how indeed do the two interact, the subjective and theinstitutional? Developmental psychologists, at last, are beginning toconcern themselves with such issues. Not Piaget, but surely Vygotskypuzzled over how individuals “internalized” the norms of their cultureand incorporated them into their sense of Self. It is a line of inquiry thatsurely merits further study.How, for example, does such internalization evolve with the growth ofa culture? Do we, as many have suggested, come in time to draw asharper distinction between our own beliefs and those incorporated inthe culture generally – between the “inner” and the “outer.”Comparative anthropological psychology must be a concern of thegeneral discipline of psychology proper. Just as we pursue comparativepsychology to study the evolution of species, so must we study howcultures evolve. Bronislaw Malinowski is surely as relevant topsychology as Charles Darwin!Let me, finally, emphasize a point that I have already touched upon. Iam deeply convinced that psychology cannot go it alone. The life ofmind is not isolated from or independent of the life of the culturalcommunity in which it develop and lives. Nor is it independent of thehistory that has shaped that cultural community. Our fate as humanbeings is shaped not only by our individual qualities but by the culturalcircumstances in which we live our lives. Why, to take a striking exam­
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ple, why is our North American system of punishing crime so muchmore punitive than it is elsewhere? We in America have some fivehundred per hundred in prison, though we’ve known for nearly a halfcentury that the chances of somebody committing a crime are roughlyfour times as great if they have served a prison term for a previouscrime. Though we know this chilling fact, we still put roughly ten timesas many people in prison per hundred thousand than any country in thecivilized Western world.I want psychology to enter the world more fully, as Malinowski didnearly a century ago, in his brilliant Crime and Custom in SavageSociety. I think such cultural inquiry (which is growing) is essential forcultivating and maintaining psychology’s breadth and scope. They makeus forever aware of the constraints and the opportunities thatcharacterize the human condition.I have said little thus far about education and educational psychology.Psychology in its varied forms has become one of the most challengingdisciplines of our day, particularly when it is paired with its historical,cultural, and biological cousins. We have learned about how our speciesmanages to cope both with the culturally established while testing thelimits of the possible. We are learning much about how our speciesreinvents itself to cope both with the constraints of our biological natureand with the opportunities of the cultural worlds that we create. And thishas real implications for education.Education is not and should not be devoted exclusively to thetransmission of established knowledge. It should also dedicate itself tocultivating awareness of the human condition and to generating skill inunderstanding the nature and sources of knowledge. That is to say,education is not only about mastering content, but also about gaininginsight into the nature of knowing and understanding. Yes, I am sayingthat we should cultivate an appropriate epistemological sensitivity in ourschool children, an awareness concerning the processes involved inlearning and thinking and not just in the finished products that we call acurriculum. It is absurd to say that children are not capable ofunderstanding such matters. Their spontaneous play activities are full ofexplorations of the possible, of what might be and why it sometimes isand sometimes isn’t. I strongly urge that we cultivate that sense of thepossible in our educational practices.
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